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Executive Summary  
 
A leading cause of military vehicle rollover crashes is that one or more wheels move into 
an area where the terrain falls away steeply or disappears, leading to vehicle rollover.  
Vehicle-mounted sensors will soon be capable of sensing such hazards in real time.  This 
report addresses the design of a driver interface to provide information about such 
hazards in a timely and cogent manner in order to allow attentive, distracted, or drowsy 
drivers enough time and information to avoid the hazard.  An interface that consists of an 
auditory warning and an optional supplementary overlay of the hazard on a driver’s-eye 
view of the roadway is recommended.  A set of equations are developed that indicate 
when the driver must begin applying either a pre-determined level of braking or a pre-
determined level of added lateral acceleration to avoid a perceived hazard.   
 
1 Introduction  
This document reports on the activities, final products, and recommendations of Task 2 
of the project “Rapid Road-Edge Detection using Biomimetic Image Processing.”  The 
project is a U.S. Army small business/innovative research (SBIR) project led by Physical 
Sciences Incorporated.  The University of Michigan Transportation Research Institute 
(UMTRI) serves as a subcontractor for human factors related issues.  The project seeks to 
provide drivers of military vehicles with real-time information about upcoming negative 
terrain features that may pose a potential threat of vehicle rollover. This is done using 
forward-looking remote sensors on the vehicle, along with novel sensor processing and 
fusion methods.   
Task 2 is entitled “Analyze Human Factors – I” and has the following goals: 
• Develop candidate driver interfaces for the road edge detection system, and 
• Develop equations that can serve as the basis of vehicle path prediction and threat 
assessment algorithms. 
Together, these goals address what information to present to the driver, as well as when 
and how to present that information.   Later, in Task 7 (“Analyze Human Factors – II”), a 
system prototype will be used to present the integrated system to experienced military 
drivers in order to validate the system concept. 
This document addresses only Task 2. The work activities of Task 2 are listed below: 
• Problem definition: a definition of scenarios in which the safety system should 
perform; identification of assumptions; and articulation of system tradeoffs 
associated with human factors. 
• Human-machine interface concepts: a definition of the role of system information 
that is provided to the driver; identification of candidate approaches to interface 
design; and a recommended approach. 
• Threat assessment: developing analytical equations that can serve as the basis for 
algorithms that define when to provide the driver with the information.. 
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A simplified view of the sequence of work on these tasks is shown in Figure 1.  Scenario 
definitions and consideration of the scenario dynamics leads to concepts for how system 
information could assist the driver.   Given the information that is to be provided to the 
driver, threat assessment algorithms are developed based on assumptions of driver 
responses, sensing capabilities, and other factors.  The driver-vehicle interface addresses 
the details of how the information is presented, e.g., size and design of visual 
information, and audio tones and volumes.  A final step is to consider the outcome of the 
preceding work tasks and information and insight contributed by the sponsors, and then 
propose final recommendations for the human factors elements.   
The remaining sections address each of the tasks in the bulleted list above.  
 
 
Figure 1.  Simplified work activity flow for Task 2  
 
2 Problem definition and considerations  
There are countless scenarios involving military vehicles in which negative terrain can 
contribute to vehicle rollover.  Early in the project, two scenarios that were identified by 
a combined effort of all organizations included:  
• Scenario 1: A HMMWV departs from a dirt road into steeper negative terrain 
during low-speed night patrol (night vision goggles, no headlamps). The primary 
cause is the driver’s loss of road-edge information due to vehicle geometry 
(difficulty seeing short-range road features over the hood) and poor demarcation 
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of road edge due to the road being in rough terrain and/or having little motor 
vehicle traffic. 
• Scenario 2: a tractor-trailer combination departs a paved road while traveling at 
moderate speeds. The primary cause is driver drowsiness or distraction.  The road 
edge would have been readily apparent to an attentive driver.  
These scenarios are very different in terms of the information that is needed by the 
crewman (continuous information vs. momentary warning), the likely state of the driver 
(fully attentive vs. distracted or possibly drowsy), the possible role of visibility issues, 
and the evasive action that would be more effective (braking vs. steering).  Because these 
and other dimensions of scenarios may have substantial influence on decisions for the 
human factors elements, an effort was made to develop assumptions regarding the basic 
casual factors behind negative terrain-induced rollovers, as well as the identification of 
selected tradeoffs that may impact the design of a driver interface.  Detailed military 
crash statistics to support these assumptions were not available.  The next three 
subsections present some assumptions regarding the scenarios to be targeted by the 
system (at least from the driver interface perspective); the causality of the crashes; and 
the response of drivers to information that may be presented about the negative terrain 
rollover risk.  Together, these set the context for considering an effective driver interface 
design, which is presented in Section 3. 
2.1 Assumptions 
This section presents high-level assumptions but is not intended to be a comprehensive 
list of assumptions. 
Hazards 
The intention of the system is assumed to be providing the driver with assistance in 
avoiding driving into a negative-terrain hazard that is located on, or near, the roadway.  
Figure 2 shows four types of hazards, four of which are assumed to be relevant to the 
intended system.  Three of these hazards are located at, alongside, or near the roadside.  
These may include drainage ditches, waterways that pass under the roadway, craters, 
culverts, terrain dropoffs, and others.  Furthermore, consideration is given to hazards that 
intrude into the roadway (but do not block the roadway).  These intruding hazards may be 
avoided by steering, and include situations such as craters or partial washouts. Although 
Figure 2 shows rectangular hazards, this is for simplicity and does not represent an 
assumption about hazard geometry.   
Figure 3 is intended to illustrate that this work includes situations in which the hazard is 
indeed quite close to the vehicle but cannot be seen by the driver due to occlusions by 
portions of the host vehicle, such as a long hood.  Representatives of the U.S. Army 
indicate that this is indeed an issue in the field for some vehicles. 
Roadways 
The vehicle is assumed to be operating on a paved or unpaved “roadway,” and is not 
operating in open terrain.  A roadway is defined for the purposes of our work as a paved 
road or an unpaved but established motor vehicle pathway.  This includes unpaved 
 6 
pathways that may or may not be improved, but the PSI sensing system is assumed to be 
capable of determining the general path that the vehicle would follow.  An example of a 
roadway is a dirt “two-track” in a rural area.  A counterexample is a footpath that does 
not meet this definition since it is not commonly used for motor vehicles.  
Location of hazards 
It is assumed that the location of relevant hazard contours with respect to the vehicle is 
available in two dimensions (e.g., down-range and cross-range). Furthermore, it is 
assumed that critical points on the edges of the hazard are available.  For example, given 
a drainage ditch that is comprised of a negative slope that begins at the road edge and 
becomes more negative as the distance from the roadside increases, an ideal 
characterization of the hazard would include a determination of the point(s) at which the 
slope presents a potential rollover hazard.  This would necessarily depend on the vehicle 
type and probable loading since, for instance, a tractor-trailer has a lower rollover 
threshold than a HMMWV.  
It is assumed that the range and confidence at which negative-terrain hazards can be 
sensed and located relative to the road edge will be limited by sensor capabilities, so that 
warnings will sometimes occur at ranges that are less than those a system with unlimited 
and perfect sensing could provide. Thus in certain cases, particularly at higher speeds and 
with hazards that are more difficult to detect and locate, the warning will provide safety 
benefits for many but not all potential crash scenarios.  An example is that an inattentive 
driver of a tractor trailer traveling at 35 m/s (77 mph) would need approximately 4 
seconds or 140 m of warning to steer to avoid a hazard that intrudes 1 m into the lane.  
The system is not likely to be capable of warning at that range, so that a warning at 70 m 
would only provide two seconds to react and avoid a hazard. 
Nuisance alerts 
Regarding the timing of warnings, it is assumed that nuisance alerts will be a major issue 
due to sensing inaccuracies as well as the system’s ignorance of the driver’s intention to 
maneuver in the near future and their state of attention. The practical strategy for warning 
the driver of hazards is then to provide warnings only at the last moment that an 
avoidance maneuver is possible.  It is further assumed that this “last moment” timing 
must accommodate a range of driver states and unknown vehicle dynamics conditions, so 
that the warning is only truly “last moment” for conditions that are relatively severe.   
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Figure 3.  A discrete hazard may pass out of the driver’s view at close range due to 












2.2 Causality of targeted crashes  
In lieu of access to crash data and subsequent analyses, the primary cause of targeted 
crashes for this system is assumed to be that the driver is unaware of the negative-terrain 
hazard soon enough to take evasive action.  The driver’s unawareness is further assumed 
to be due to inattention and/or visibility problems.   
Driver inattention is considered a failure to monitor the roadway or a reduced level of 
monitoring relative to the driver’s baseline performance with their full and wakeful 
attention to the road. Inattention may result from drowsiness or distraction.  In this 
application, distraction is likely related to engagement in other non-driving, mission-
related tasks.  In either case, a simple descriptive model is that the driver is “out of the 
loop” for a period of time.   
Visibility issues arise from different sources: 
• Near-field visibility issues are assumed to be due to occlusion by the driver’s own 
vehicle (determined by vehicle geometry and relationship to hazard), as well as 
atmospheric visibility issues and/or lack of illumination. 
• Mid-field and far-field visibility  issues are assumed to be due primarily to 
atmospheric conditions (dust, snow, fog), occlusions by other vehicles or roadway 
geometry (e.g., crests), or lack of illumination.  
There are instances in which the combination of inattention and visibility issues may lead 
to crashes when only one factor would not. For example, consider lower-speed night-time 
operations on a minor mountain road with good atmospheric visibility and steep negative 
terrain hazards at the right edge of a road.  The driver may be capable of seeing several 
seconds ahead, so that a washout of the rightmost 0.5 m of the roadbed for a short 
segment can be observed.  But due to the distraction of other mission tasks, the driver 
may lose track of where the washout begins, forget about the hazard, or unknowingly 
drift further to the right than intended.  Upon returning his or her attention to the hazard, 
the front of the vehicle may occlude where the hazard begins.  Therefore neither 
inattention nor visibility alone may lead to a rollover, but a combination of those factors 
may.  
2.3 Crash avoidance responses to system information 
There are three possible vehicle-control responses when the driver decides an avoidance 
maneuver is necessary: 
• Braking only 
• Steering only 
• Braking and steering 
To first order, the range needed for a driver-reaction-plus-steering response is 
proportional to the initial vehicle speed, while the braking response is a quadratic 
function of vehicle speed.  (See a later section for more details.) Hence the relative 
effectiveness of steering alone (or steering with braking) as a means of avoiding a hazard 
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is often – but not always – better than braking alone.  This is not true at very low speeds, 
when braking has advantages, and there are other situations in which the driver may not 
have sufficient information to be confident that steering is a safe maneuver.   
Considering further avoidance maneuvers, the anticipated driver responses to the five 
types of negative-terrain hazards illustrated earlier are summarized in Table 1.  Four 
evasive actions are shown in the table: steering to remain on the road, steering to delay 
road departure until after passing a discrete roadside hazard, steering to initiate a new 
path (avoiding an on-road hazard), and braking to rest before reaching a hazard ahead 
(whether off-road or on-road).  The table is a simplification since steering and braking 
may both be involved in an evasive maneuver.  Furthermore, the actual effectiveness of 
an evasive response to any one of the hazard types depends on many factors.  
However, the simplified table makes a number of useful points.  First, the nature of 
evasive maneuvers (and hence the timing of warnings to the driver) are related to the type 
of hazards.  Braking may be a primary response only for certain on-road hazards.  
Braking will likely be a useful option for roadside hazards at very low speeds, as will be 
discussed later.  But the scope of hazards that the system addresses (i.e., whether on-road 
hazards are addressed) will affect the warning timing and, in turn, the requirements on 
sensing ranges since braking to rest at moderate to high speeds takes much longer than 
steering-to-avoid maneuvers.   
The table also points out that steering maneuvers may take on different forms.  Steering 
to remain on the road is different than steering to go around an on-road hazard and will 
require less warning range.   These statements will be supported later by discussions in 
the section on driver responses, and eventually by equations and simulation validation.  
 
Table 1.  Hazard types and assumed primary (1) and secondary (2) evasive responses 
 
Hazard 






Steer to delay road 











1   2 
Onset of extended 
roadside hazard 
1   2 
Discrete roadside 
hazard 
1 2  2 
Intruding  
hazard 
  1 1 




Figure 4 shows a conceptual illustration of the range needed for different evasion 
maneuvers as a function of speed.  Shown on this figure are some observations about two 
types of visibility issues – occlusions at near range that are due to the host vehicle, and 
visibility issues at longer ranges due to atmospheric conditions or illumination.  Please 
note that this figure is inaccurate in its depictions of the relative range at which steering, 
braking, and normal road preview are required, but is useful to illustrate that, for 
example, occlusion by the host vehicle is an issue that can be addressed only at low 
speeds, or by making the driver aware of the hazard at an earlier time.  The figure also 
shows that vision issues related to atmospheric visibility and illumination are more 
pressing problems at higher vehicle speeds. 
 
Figure 4.  Conceptual overlaying of visibility issues with warning ranges needed to avoid 
hazards by steering or braking  
 
The combined ability of the vehicle and the driver to execute a stable evasive maneuver 
should be considered in setting warning algorithm parameters.  Since it is infeasible to 
detect and account for individual driver capabilities, the primary factor becomes the 
vehicle and general assumptions about driver responses.  The following are some of the 
factors that will affect the stability and effectiveness of braking and/or steering 
maneuvers:  
 
In general, factors that influence effective evasive maneuvers include, but are not limited 
to: 
• Vehicle speed 
• Vehicle rollover threshold (e.g., static rollover threshold) 
• Vehicle roll stability  
• Handling and braking capability of the vehicle system 
• Road surface characteristics, especially friction, roll-tripping elements, loose 
surface, etc.,  
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• The driver’s perception of the roadway beyond the hazard (for considering 
possibly negative, secondary effects of an evasion) 
• Oncoming traffic (not considered in this work) 
• Possible negative impacts of steering and/or braking maneuvers on other crew 
members, vehicle elements, and onboard cargo or hardware 
• Proximity of following vehicles. 
 
Many of these factors cannot be taken into account in real time because measurements or 
estimates are not available.  Nevertheless, these factors may influence higher-level 
decisions about what the real-time algorithms should seek to achieve.  For example, in 
the civilian domain, steering is not considered a reasonable assumption for an inattentive 
driver who receives a warning for a discrete, intruding hazard.  This is true because there 
are too many possible negative effects of a sudden lane change or swerve by an 
inattentive driver in that application, since experiments have shown that drivers are 
reluctant to make steering maneuvers in surprise rear-end crash situations.  Thus the 
bulleted factors above may influence the system, but most will not be available in real 
time.  
The comments below address selected items within the above bullet list.  A later section 
addresses the availability of estimates of these and other variables.  
• Vehicle effects: It will be important to capture some aspects of the vehicle type 
and its likely configuration in parameters that are used in warning decisions 
algorithms.  This will include rollover threshold estimates as well as handling and 
braking capabilities.  
 
• Road surface effects: Road surface effects may constrain braking levels and 
handling maneuvers that are supportable by the driving surface.  Tripped rollover 
considerations are also appropriate to consider.1  The most important item is 
likely to be whether the road is paved or not.  This may not be available, however. 
 
• Road geometry effects: Road curvature influences the effectiveness of avoidance 
maneuvering.  In general, when compared to a straight road segment, a hazard in 
a curve will be harder to evade when the curvature is such that the hazard is on 
the “outside” of the curve (e.g., a hazard on the right of the lane when curvature is 
to the left).  Conversely, evasion is more effective than even a straight road 
segment when the hazard is on the “inside” of the curve (e.g., a hazard on the 
right of the lane when curvature is to the right).   This will be true for braking and 
is especially true for steering. 
 
The current document addresses basic vehicle effects and road geometry effects in the 
following manner.  Vehicles are first assumed to be two-axis vehicles and not tractor 
trailer vehicles or other multi-axis vehicles with or without trailers.  Second, road 
curvature and path curvatures are considered in detail, although the effects of grade are 
                                                 
1 Assume that wetness or muddiness of a road is not observable or available.  Wetness or muddiness (or 
snowiness) is often due to precipitation that occurred hours or days beforehand, and spring thawing often 
creates low friction conditions on sunny days.   
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not accounted for in terms of the timing of warning drivers.  Finally, road surface effects 
are not addressed.  This and many other considerations that are likely to be significant in 
the field are beyond the scope of this initial effort. 
 
3 Driver-vehicle interface concepts 
The driver-vehicle interface (DVI) for the intended system is based on the system goals 
and assumptions that were described in Section 2.  More specifically, the objectives of 
the DVI are to (1) warn the driver of an oncoming hazard in the driver’s future path, 
(2) provide the warning in a timely manner, sufficiently early to allow for a reasonable 
avoidance response, and (3) when appropriate, inform the driver of a possible response, 
including alternative options that could be used to avoid the hazard. 
The role of the countermeasure in assisting the driver to avoid negative-terrain hazards 
will depend on the scenario, and especially on the driver’s state and the visibility of the 
roadside hazards.  Among the roles that the countermeasure may play are the following: 
a) Provide complementary information for the driver’s vision in poor visibility 
situations (especially near-field) 
b) Provide a “copilot’s” reminder of an upcoming hazard that can be perceived by 
the driver 
c) Provide a copilot’s convenient and continual “packaging” of information about 
the roadway including hazards and the relative direction to be maintained – useful 
for simplifying a heavily tasked driver  
d) Warn the driver to return their attention to the driving task, especially when the 
driver is inattentive or drowsy.   
e) Provide advisory information on an on-demand basis so that it is not interfering 
with normal operation but is available when needed. 
f) As the system has no knowledge of the state of the driver, there may be nuisance 
alarms that result from the system’s assumptions about the driver’s attentiveness.  
The countermeasure will have some level of adjustment to account for this by 
allowing an attentive driver to disable, or mute, the system to reduce undesired 
annoyance. 
 
3.1 Human factors considerations 
The main Human Factors considerations in the decision about an optimal DVI appear 
below.  (This is a selected subset of issues raised in Campbell et al., 2007.)  Decisions 
about addressing these questions in the intended application are based on input from 
UMTRI and PSI. 
1. What is the number of warning stages: Imminent warning only, or cautionary 
warning(s) followed by an imminent warning? 
2. What is the best way to make warnings compatible with expected driver 
responses? 
3. How to prevent false or nuisance warnings? 
4. What is the optimal timing of warnings? Generally speaking, response time to a 
warning is on the order of 1 s. 
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5. What is the preferred modality of the warning?  (consideration of auditory, visual, 
and haptic) 
6. What are the main characteristics of the warning signal?  (e.g., conspicuous, 
distinguishable, conveys meaning and urgency, , not annoying, etc.) 
7. Driver control (adjustments) for system sensitivity and behavior. 
 
Table 2 uses the following terms to describe the role of information provided: 
• Driver support: Support visibility (e.g., continual displays of steering direction or 
hazard location that the driver may decide to consult) 
• Guidance: Guide driver (e.g., continual displays of steering direction or hazard 
location that the driver must consult) 
• Warnings: Warn driver when necessary to enable an inattentive driver to return 
attention to the driving task (e.g., momentary audio tone) or to notice an 
upcoming hazard (e.g., audio tone with overlay on a continual display).    
 
 
Table 2.  Levels of information conveyed to the driver  
Driver state 
Visibility 
Good visibility  
(except blind spots) 
Poor visibility far 
ahead (e.g., 4 sec 
ahead) 
Poor visibility near 
(e.g., 1 sec ahead) 
Attentive 
No imminent action 
needed 
Cover blind spots 
visually or provide 
supplement information 
Hazard alerts Continual driver 
support with warnings 
for specific hazards 
Attentive with lapses, or 
inattentive 
Hazard alert to prompt 
attentiveness (preferred 
auditory and/or Haptic) 
Hazard alerts 
It is possible to convey 
desired response in the 
alert (e.g., swerve 
left/right)  
Continual driver 
support with warnings 
*We assume that it is 
likely a driver will be 
attentive when near 




3.2 Candidate driver interface approaches 
 
Three DVI approaches are considered below based on our analysis of human factors 
needs for the system.  The approaches are all plausible, but differ in their intended 
purpose and expected effectiveness for various scenarios.  
 





Lateralized auditory alert when a negative terrain (low speed) or a lane departure (high 
speed) is detected.  The alert is similar to existing civilian applications of Lane Departure 
Warning (LDW) (e.g., see LeBlanc et. al, 2006.)  The auditory component is lateralized 
so that it is heard on the left when the danger is on the left and on the right when the 
danger is on the right.  A haptic component could be added as a lateralized seat shaker.  A 
visual component is not recommended in this option. This solution best applies to high-
speed, known-path driving but could work in off-road situations. Regarding the list of 
Human Factors considerations in the introduction to this section, the preferred modality 
here is auditory.  .   
 
Other issues or features of this option are: 
• It is assumed that speakers can be added to the vehicle, and preferrably speakers 
to allow lateralization of the alert (right-side hazard leads to an auditory alert on 
the driver’s right side) 
• It is assumed that there is not a technical feasibility of a haptic solution in the 
presence of high vibration, especially on unpaved roads. 
• The issue of annoyance and false alarms is center to the decision about using 
auditory alerts.  Acceptance is heavily related to the level of perceived annoyance. 
• The auditory alert solution is an accepted solution in current and near-future 
civilian solutions and should be explored seriously for this system if civilian 
transportation is of interest for this product. 
 
 




A map view (or birds-eye view) visual display indicates at a minimum the position of the 
hazard area and current position of vehicle relative to the expected future path of the 
vehicle.  This solution is primarily geared toward off-the-road driving where the future 
path of the vehicle is not entirely clear, and the driver can choose to change the path in 
the presence of the indicated danger.  This solution is also geared toward low speed 
driving in which the driver may already be aware of the hazard, and the map view is used 
by the driver during maneuvering.   The display is likely to be helpful when visibility is 
low (e.g., night time, no headlights, fog, rain). 
 
Visual is the preferred modality to present spatial information. In terms of the Human 
Factors considerations, this option involves a continuous display of advisory information.  
We do not suggest relying on a visual display only for warnings, so the visual information 
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is only for advisory information when the driver is already known to be looking at the 
display.  When a warning is required, the auditory cue is best (see option 1 above).  The 
presentation of visual information should consider time lag in the display presentation 
and interpretation; excessive latencies may undermine the utility of this approach. 
 
A visual display requires looking away from the road and is therefore not generally the 
desired solution for a warning system.  It is preferred that the information would be 
conveyed to the driver on an on-demand basis for expected events and other solutions be 
proposed for alerting the driver of an unexpected situation.  
 





The driver-view option assumes that a night vision system or some other camera view 
system is installed and available in the vehicle.  The camera view is displayed to the 
driver (possibly on-demand only) and is overlaid with information about the location of 
danger areas ahead.  This solution differs from the map-view solution in that the display 
is likely to be used when visibility is low and could be combined with a night vision 
system. 
 
The Human Factors considerations are similar to option 2. 
 
3.3 Recommended driver-vehicle interface concept 
Based on our analysis and discussions of the technical assumptions and limitations with 
project partners, the recommended concept for driver interface is a combination of the 
first and third approaches above.. 
 
1) Visual and auditory display capabilities: 
a) Auditory alert 
• The system will have the capability to play a wav file as an auditory alert with 
a lateral (left/right) component.   
(UMTRI can provide reference to results from the IVBSS experiments on 
tones for lane departure for light vehicles and for trucks.) 
• An auditory alert will be presented only once for any given hazardous area. 
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• Note that often a hazard will be displayed for some time before the auditory 
alert occurs.   At other times, the hazard will appear on the screen at the same 
time as the occurrence of the auditory alert. 
b) A visual color display, with at least an on/off switch, but preferably an 
implemented logic for automatic on and off as a function of the vehicle speed and 
other environment factors.  The display will consist of: 
•  A driver’s view video (regular camera view or night vision view) of forward 
scene, plus  
• overlay of significant negative-terrain hazards when appropriate, plus 
• sensor coverage area, including area already scanned (e.g., triangle showing 
maximum range and azimuthal scan), plus 
• vehicle path prediction indicated as an “arc” overlaid on the image 
 
2) Overlay of hazards on the display 
a) Determining when overlays are available, i.e., higher-level decision regarding 
whether system is in the mode to present this information: 
• Manual: overlays are shown based on driver selection (see driver controls 
below) 
• Automatic: alternative to a driver-controlled mode switch: Visual overlay of 
hazard is activated in all conditions, unless the speed exceeds 45 mph or the 
visibility is “good,” as indicated by a vision-based sensing of ambient 
illumination and consideration of LIDAR backscatter.   
b) Ongoing determination of which hazards should have overlays associated with 
them: 
• See threat assessment.  This depends on hazard location, speed, and yaw rate. 
c) How to overlay hazard areas:  White “X” at the nearest corner of the hazard 
(details TBD) 
d) Overlaying vehicle path:  White “arc” shows the yaw-rate-based path ahead.  This 
overlay is activated only when a hazard area is highlighted on the display and 
presents the driver with an easy way to confirm the intention of the system alert. 
e) Upon presenting an auditory alert, the visual overlay associated with that hazard 
may be highlighted briefly (e.g., 5 seconds) 
3) Driver controls: 
a) Three-position “switch”   
• System off;   
• Auditory alerts enabled;   
• Auditory alerts and Display enabled 
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b) Volume level control with a range that is adjusted to the vehicle noise 
characteristics.  As a default, about 80 db at the driver’s ears is desired. 
4) System status information 
• System status indicator implemented as an LED or other visual, as shown 
below. 
 
Table 3.  Indications of system staste to the driver 
System state Indication to driver 
Off (determined by driver control) None 
Not operating – basic operating conditions not 
appropriate:  e.g., speed too low 
Fault indicator  on (e.g., red LED): the system 
is not operating 
Not operating – low confidence or fault state Fault indicator on (e.g., red LED): the system 
has low confidence.  Consider threshold to 
prevent flicker of the indicator 
Operating – auditory alerts enabled System availability Indicator (e.g., green LED) 
the system is on. 
Operating – auditory alerts and display 
enabled 
Triangle on overlay showing coverage zone 
 
 
4 Path prediction  
Path prediction is the real-time computation of the expected future location of the vehicle.  
This is useful for determining whether the vehicle appear to be headed for an encounter 
with a perceived negative-terrain hazard.  Uncertainties which affect the accuracy of the 
prediction include measurement uncertainties and uncertainties in the model used to 
compute the future path model.  One of the most important uncertainties involves the 
path model’s necessary assumptions about the steering or braking action that the driver 
may take in the near future.   
Two subsections follow – the first addresses definitions and assumptions, and the second 
presents equations for predicting the vehicle path based on a steady-state cornering 
model.  
4.1 Definitions and assumptions 
Vehicle coordinate system: 
The International Standards Organization (ISO) convention for vehicle-fixed coordinate 
systems is used, with the x axis pointing forward along the vehicle centerline, the y axis 
laterally out the left side of the vehicle (driver’s side in the US configuration), and the z 
axis vertical away from the earth.   
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To define the origin of the vehicle-fixed coordinate system used in this document, begin 
with a point at or near the sensor location, then translate that point to the centerline of the 
vehicle (along the longitudinal (x) axis). The vertical (z) location of the origin need not be 
defined for these equations.  This is because roll & pitch effects are not significant for the 
purposes of these equations. (These effects are very significant for the sensor-to-vehicle-
coordinates transformation, and the projection of sensor coordinates onto the terrain, but 
that is outside the scope of this memo.)   
Measurements 
Two basic measurements are critical to the system – yaw rate, r, and vehicle speed.  
Because of the specific application addressed in this project, and because of the 
aftermarket nature of the system and its intended implementation across many types of 
vehicles, these will be the only two measurements available, except for the location of 
negative-terrain hazards.  
Two forms of vehicle speed are relevant:  the magnitude of the velocity vector at the 
origin of the coordinate system, V, and the forward vehicle speed, which is generally 
defined as the component of the velocity vector measured along the x axis, u.  In practice, 
V and u can be assumed to be equal and may be measured using speed signals provided 
by the vehicle (u) or speed collected from a GPS unit (V).  The equations below use the 
proper type of vehicle speed (u  or  V), but under the operating assumptions that are 
interchangeable. 
Appendix A addresses practical considerations for the use of GPS for vehicle speed. Yaw 
rate should come from a dedicated yaw rate sensor; Appendix A addresses the potential 
and challenges of using GPS to compute yaw rate.  
The path prediction equations and the threat assessment algorithms that are developed 
later in this section or in Section 5 require the ratio of two vehicle parameters, 
)/( rr Cm α , where 
rm   effective mass on the rear axle 
rCα  cornering stiffness of the rear axle, e.g., N/rad 
In practice, the values of rm  and rCα  will be poorly known in the field.  For the 
purposes of engineering development, UMTRI can provide reasonable estimates for this 
ratio if the following values are provided: 
• Vehicle type 
• Curb weight (unloaded), gross vehicle weight rating (with maximum load 
allowed), and typical loading of vehicle 
• Tire size (e.g., “P205/50R15”), and number of tires per axle 
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Operating conditions  
The vehicle speeds to be considered are assumed to be between 5 and 30 m/sec. The 
maximum sensor range is assumed to be 60 m, with an azimuthal sweep of plus or minus 
30 degrees.  These assumptions on speed and sensor coverage lead to upper and lower 
bounds on path radii to be considered.  Furthermore, it can be assumed that at the time of 
an alert, vehicle will not be traveling so as to create levels of lateral acceleration that are 
well above normal levels expected in the field.  A limit of 0.4 g is assumed to be 
reasonable for larger vehicles with two or more axles.   
4.2 Vehicle path prediction 
This section presents equations for predicting the future location of the vehicle –
specifically, the origin of the vehicle-fixed coordinate system –  based on estimates of the 
current speed u and yaw rate r. Note that explicitly predicting path is optional for a 
warning system – the expressions provided in Section 5 on threat assessment could be 
used to leave much of the relationships in this section moot. 
 
Steady-state cornering and sideslip angle 
 
In the field, there will be no information about the steer angle, accelerations, or even the 
actual rotational inertial properties of the vehicle. This leaves us with the need to assume 
that the vehicle is either traveling perfectly straight ahead or – much more commonly – is 
following a circular arc.  The latter case is termed steady-state cornering and will apply 
here when the measured or estimated yaw rate is nonzero.  The radius of the arc will be 
simply  
r
uR =  . (1) 
 
It is well known that body sideslip occurs in steady state cornering. Body sideslip is the 
difference between the direction of travel (velocity vector) and the vehicle x axis, as 
shown in Figure 5.  Sideslip is important to consider since the sensor-to-vehicle 
transformation will reconcile the sensor information with the vehicle axis, but then it 
needs to be further reconciled with the motion of the vehicle.  The body sideslip angle 
varies along the length of the vehicle.  For typical motions and the operating condition 
assumptions , body sideslip will be less than a few degrees, and more typically less than 
half a degree.  These amounts can be significant at higher speeds since, for instance, 
when traveling at 20 m/sec (45 mph), an error in sideslip of 0.5 deg is equivalent to 0.5 m 
of error in the predicted position of the vehicle at a time 3 sec into the future (60 m).  
 
At a point that is a distance b ahead of the rear axle, the sideslip angle β is proportional to 















































u forward speed, m/s 
V speed along the velocity vector, m/s 
b longitudinal distance from PSI sensor location to rear axle, m 
rm   effective mass on rear axle (Fz/g on rear axle), Kg 
rCα   rear axle cornering stiffness, N/rad 
r  yaw rate, rad/s (positive when vehicle is rotating about the positive z-
axis, i.e., counterclockwise, as viewed from above) 
 
At low speeds, the first term of the equation above dominates, so that the sideslip angle 
for any point in front of the rear axle (b>0) has the same sign than the sign of yaw rate.  
This means the rear wheels track further inboard than the front wheels.  Figure 5 is an 
example of this situation, with the counter-clockwise arc (positive yaw rate) resulting in a 
positive sideslip angle.   
 
At higher speeds, the sideslip angle and the yaw rate have different signs.  At these higher 
speeds, the rear wheels are tracking further outboard.  For a positive yaw rate (counter-




Figure 5. Motion of a vehicle in steady state cornering (low-speed case shown) 
 
Path in vehicle-based coordinates 
 
In steady-state cornering, the path of the origin O of the vehicle coordinate system will 
follow an arc.  The arc will be tangent to the velocity vector V  and will have a radius of 
curvature of ruR /= , as shown in Figure 5.  The predicted path in vehicle coordinates 












For convenience, consider also (x’, y’), another  vehicle-fixed coordinate system with the 
same origin as (x,y), but with x’ aligned with the current velocity vector and y’ 
orthogonal to x’ (such that z’ and z both point vertically upward).  That is, (x’, y’) would 
apply if there was no body sideslip angle. 
 
For ideal straight-line driving with no yaw rate, the sideslip angle β  is zero, and (x,y) 










For steady-state cornering, however, the future path of point O will follow an arc, and in 






































The above equations is probably the most practical expression for path prediction.  Recall 
that these expressions are for steady-state cornering, and when yaw rate becomes close to 
zero, the straight-line driving expressions developed earlier must be used. 
 
4.3 Uncertainty in path prediction 
Errors in path prediction  will be due to several factors, including: 
1. the errors in measuring speed (u) and yaw rate (r ),  
2. error in the assumption that speed and yaw rate remain constant over the time 
period T,  
3. error in the assumptions of a flat road,  
4. error in the assumed values of rear-axle mass and cornering stiffness, and 
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5. errors in the use of the so-called “bicycle” model that describes steady state 
cornering for two-axis vehicles, and especially errors that may result at lower 
speeds and small curve radii. 
This memo treats only the first error, i.e., errors in measuring speed and yaw rate.  In 
order to treat the remaining errors in a standard manner, the path prediction and path 
uncertainty would need to be computed recursively in the real-time system, so that the 
resulting computations would consist of a real-time numerical integration to predict the 
future path, and an associated integration to compute a covariance matrix.   
The path prediction expressions address two cases:  when the nominal yaw rate is non-
zero (steady-state cornering assumed), and  when the yaw rate is zero or very close to 
zero (straight-line driving).  The uncertainty developed here is the covariance matrix 
associated with the predicted position (x,y), where again the position is estimated relative 
to the current position at t=0, and expressed in the coordinate frame as it is oriented at 
t=0.  
Define uΔ  and rΔ  as the measurement errors in speed and yaw rate, respectively, such 
that the true speed u and the true yaw rate r  at time t =0 can be written as a function of 








Let the errors in speed and yaw rate be mutually independent and zero mean.  Thus the 
variances in the predicted position (x,y) can be approximated by using the first order 





























where the sensitivity variables baS ,  denote the partial derivative of a with respect to b, 
evaluated at the conditions at the start of the prediction.  Therefore the covariance matrix 

















The values for S  are derived in Appendix B, and are a function of  r, u, and the 
prediction interval T.    
 
For yaw rate near zero.   When the yaw rate is zero or is very close to zero (e.g., with a 
magnitude less than 0.002 radian/sec), the assumption of travel on a circular arc does not 
hold and computations using expressions based on circular arcs will be unstable.  In the 
case of zero or almost-zero yaw rates, the predicted location of the origin of the vehicle-
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fixed coordinate system at a time T in the future is given by equation (3).  Those 
expressions, however,  are not useful for developing the sensitivity to errors in yaw rate 
or speed because they do not include effects of curvature.  A pair of equations that are 












Therefore the sensitivities to errors in speed u and yaw rate r (which are defined by the 


























































The uncertainty in the path of equation (14) is then expressed as a covariance matrix 
















2 =⋅+⋅= rryrxuuyuxxy SSSS σσσ  
 
For non-zero yaw rate (steady-state cornering).  The sensitivity of the predicted path 
will again depend on the speed u  and yaw rate r.  It is useful to first present some useful 
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The sensitivities of x to changes in speed u and yaw rate r are derived by using the chain 


























































































The expression for uxS ,  shows that the sensitivity of errors in predicting the x component 
has two terms, the first of which simply shows that the error in x grows linearly with 
time. This first term describes the simple effect that speed errors integrate with time. The 
second term comes from both the impact of speed on the sideslip angle and as well as its 
impact on the radius of curvature.   
The expression for rxS ,  also has two terms.   
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The sensitivities of y to changes in speed u and yaw rate r are derived in a manner similar 







































































































The errors in the prediction of (x,y) can be computed using equations (12), (13), and those 
directly above.    
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5 Threat assessment 
Threat assessment consists of real-time algorithms that determine whether driver 
information should be presented.  Two rules for when to present auditory alerts are 
presented below; these comprise a first set of threat assessment approaches and algorithm 
sets.  The first rule is that a warning should be presented if the driver must 
instantaneously change the lateral acceleration by a certain amount in order to avoid a 
negative-terrain hazard.  The second rule is that a warning should be provided if the 
driver, after a short reaction time, must apply a step change in deceleration in order to 
stop before a hazard.    
The rule of thumb in the passenger vehicle market for highway vehicles in the US and 
Europe has been to assume the driver will use steering maneuvers for most lateral threats 
(run-off-road), and braking for forward threats (rear-end crash scenarios).  But for the 
latter, it is also true that warnings for forward threats are timed to strike a compromise 
between maximum safety benefit (timely warnings) and reducing annoyance that comes 
when the driver is attentive and intending to steer around the vehicle ahead, or when the 
driver is anticipating the lead vehicle will leave the lane.   
 
This comment is relevant for the current problem because alert and attentive drivers will 
often be intending to begin a maneuver when a conservative warning is provided.  Thus it 
is likely in the soldier’s interests to delay warnings as long as possible, and delay alerts 
when any evidence of driver attention is noted, e.g., steering rate or longitudinal 
accelerations. 
 
A high-level warning rule set is suggested: 
 
1. Warn when there is neither sufficient distance (at current speeds) to steer around 
the hazard using a moderate steering maneuver, nor distance to brake to a stop 
before the hazard using moderate braking.   
 
2. If there is any evidence of a safety-positive change in the path direction or 
application of braking, delay the alert until there is neither sufficient distance to 
steer around the hazard using a strong steering maneuver, nor distance to brake to 
a stop before the hazard using strong braking.   
 
Path direction change:  If change in yaw rate is more than 5 deg/sec2. 
 
Application of braking:   If the absolute value of deceleration is greater 
than 1 m/sec2. 
 
3. Do not issue warnings if the time to collision is less than 5 seconds. (This reflects 
a desire to reduce false alerts that occur when drivers are attentive but have not 
yet begun a steering or braking maneuver.)  
 
4. Require that the threat assessment criteria is met for 0.3 seconds. 
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5. Require that the vehicle operating speed is between 3 and 30 m/sec. 
 
The computation of the distances referred to in the first two items are now addressed in 
turn.   
 
Threat assessment with braking as an evasive maneuver  
A basic rule is proposed to consider hazard avoidance through driver braking in order to 
bring the vehicle to rest just at the identified hazard location:  
Warn the driver if the distance to a hazard equals the vehicle stopping distance 
plus the distance traveled during a short driver reaction time.  
 
Assume that the response to such a warning involves a period of constant speed travel 
(for duration RT), followed by a step change in acceleration of *xaΔ , relative to ongoing 
acceleration, where *xaΔ  is negative for additional deceleration.  Assume the current 
vehicle speed along the longitudinal axis is denoted u and the current acceleration is xa  













++⋅=  . 
 
Parameters to use: 
 
*xaΔ   -2.5 m/s
2 when 2sec/0.1 max −>  (driver not braking significantly) and -
1.5 m/s2 when 2sec/0.1 max −≤  (driver is braking) 
RT  0.7 s when 2sec/0.1 max −>  (driver not braking significantly) and 0.25 sec 
when 2sec/0.1 max −≤  currently, or within the last 3 seconds 
(significant driver braking assumed to signal attentiveness to hazards) 
 
The variation of RT above is very useful in practice. 
 
Threat assessment for steering as an evasive maneuver  
A basic rule is proposed to consider hazard avoidance through driver steering :  
Warn the driver if avoiding a hazard requires an instantaneous step change in 
lateral acceleration that exceeds a threshold.  The new lateral acceleration is 
assumed to be applied throughout the remainder of the path prediction period. 
 
Thus, if the lateral acceleration required to avoid the hazard differs from the current value 
of lateral acceleration by more than the threshold value, a warning should be considered.   
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Since hazards are not points but regions, it is assumed that two points are defined per 
hazard – a leftmost point, LP  and a rightmost point, RP , as seen from the vehicle. Define 
ya   as the current lateral acceleration (positive when yaw rate is positive), Lya ,  as the 
value of lateral acceleration that would result in the path of the vehicle intersecting the 
leftmost point, and Rya ,  as the value associated with a steady-state path intersecting with 
the rightmost point.  Define also the threshold for the change in lateral acceleration, 
0* >Δa . Then for that hazard, the basic warning rule is: 
Warn if *)(*)( ,, yLyyyRy aaaaa Δ+≤≤Δ−    (3) 
 
Threshold value, *yaΔ  
 
Value for threshold:  A first suggestion is that *yaΔ = 2 m/s
2.  
 
The specific relationships derived in this document will yield relatively “late” warnings, 
but a simple adjustment to the threshold can produce a more conservative warning 
system.  These relationships are described as “late” because the system is only allowing 
the driver enough distance to avoid the hazard through a single step change in lateral 
acceleration.  That means that when the vehicle has traveled far enough down-range to 
reach the hazard, the vehicle will have significant speed laterally which must presumably 
be removed – probably by lateral acceleration in the opposite direction – once the critical 
point of the hazard is passed.  This leads to overshoot in the lateral direction that will 
require a safe-travel zone of approximately the same lateral distance as that consumed in 
the avoidance maneuver– and there may or may not be sufficient room for that.   
 
A more conservative approach would be to provide warnings with enough distance to 
both avoid the obstacle and return the vehicle path to a direction parallel to the initial 
curved path by the time the hazard is reached. This would require exactly twice the 
distance, if one assumes this is accomplished by two step inputs of lateral acceleration in 
sequence– the first to avoid the hazard (e.g., to the left), and the second to return the 
vehicle to a forward direction (e.g., lateral acceleration to the right).  This approach can 
be effected simply by using a threshold *yaΔ  which is half the value suggested here.  
This, of course, doubles the warning distance for steering. 
 
There are other variations that are easily accommodated as well.  Instead of a step change 
in lateral acceleration, a sinusoidal variation in lateral acceleration can be used.  This also 
leads to a simple adjustment of the threshold that also involves applying a fixed 
multiplier to the threshold.   Since the threshold is likely to be tuned in the vehicle during 
engineering development, these adjustments are not necessary to pursue analytically.  
 
The remainder of this document, however, uses the approach that allows only for the 
single step change in lateral acceleration before the hazard is reached. 
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Computing lateral acceleration values 
 
Assume the vehicle is in steady-state cornering, with vehicle coordinate system origin O 
moving with velocity vector V.  The yaw rate r, path radius R, forward speed u, speed 








Vr y ====  . 
 
Consider now a point P which represents a point hazard, as shown in Figure 6.  (The 
results will be generalized later to handle finite-sized hazard regions that must be 
avoided.  In addition, even a continuous road edge can be represented by a series of 
points at the road edge.)  
 
Let d be the distance from origin O to P, and let φ  be the angle between the current 
velocity vector V and the vector from O to P.  If the sideslip angle β is known or 
estimated and the sensor system has estimates of the distance to the hazard and its 
location with respect to the vehicle coordinate, then d and φ   are known.   
 
Note also that  
PP θβφ += , 
where Pθ  is the azimuth angle from the vehicle longitudinal x axis to the hazard. 
 
As shown in the figure, assume that the current yaw rate r and speed V means that the 
origin of the vehicle coordinate system will not intersect with P.  Instead, define a new 
path radius  PR  that would lead to such an intersection.  The center of curvature for this 




dRP =  . 
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Recall the warning rule equation (3):  
*)(*)( ,, yLyyyRy aaaaa Δ+≤≤Δ−  
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This now becomes: 
 










































































Yet another equivalent expression set is derived simply by rearranging the final 
expression given above, and solving each of the two inequalities for the distance to the 
left- and right-side points associated with a hazard: 
 































Figure 6  Steady-state cornering paths associated with avoiding hazard P 
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Accounting for vehicle width 
Assume the vehicle width is w, as measured between the outer edges of the tires on the 
widest axle.  Then the relationships above hold if we adjust φ  to a value wφ  to move the 









−=φφ  for the right side of a hazard. 
Accounting for towed trailers 
Towed trailers are not addressed in this document.  Additional maneuvering room would 
need to be allowed for towed trailers.  “Off-tracking” is the tendency of trailers to cut 
corners, and the values depend on the configuration of the axles, the towing mechanisms, 
speed, and the loading of the tractor and trailer.    
Conclusion 
The Task 2 report presented a recommended set of algorithms and driver interface 
concepts that could serve as the basis for a prototype vehicle system.  When integrated 
with the remote sensing system to detect relevant hazards, the result should be a 
reasonable first implementation of a technology that may be capable of preventing the set 
of rollover crashes during military operations that are due to unseen negative terrain 
features.  The interface concepts include an auditory alert coupled at specific times with a 
visual display of a driver’s view of the roadway with an overlay of hazard locations.  The 
algorithms assume that a driver’s response to the alert would be at least equivalent in 
evasion effectiveness as applying a specified level of braking or a different specified 
level of additional lateral acceleration to avoid the hazard.  Finally, an appendix is 
included to advise on the use of GPS alone to estimate vehicle speed and yaw rate.  While 
vehicle speed is possible with GPS, yaw rate will very likely require a separate sensor. 
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Appendix A:  Using GPS for vehicle speed and yaw rate 
 
This appendix reports on comparisons of the GPS-based measurements for vehicle speed 
and vehicle yaw rate with measurements of those same quantities that used, respectively, 
ABS wheel speed sensors and a fiber optic yaw rate gyro.  The comparisons are not 
statistical in nature, but are based on a few samples of data from a previous project in 
which data was collected from a fleet of 11 vehicles equipped with GPS, yaw rate gyros, 
and ABS wheel speed sensors [3].  Although 83,000 miles of data was collected, only a 
few trips are presented here.  The conclusions seem to be borne out by even this small set 
of data.  
The GPS receiver was a Trimble differential GPS receiver configured for a 5 Hz real time 
update using a satellite-based differential correction broadcast (OmniSky).  The yaw rate 
sensor was a KVH fiber optic gyro, and the vehicle speed was from the OEM sensors on 
a 2003 Nissan Altima 3.5SE.  Nissan provided UMTRI with the vehicle CAN bus data 
protocols for the Road Departure Crash Warning System Field Operational Test [3]. 
A.1 Vehicle speed from GPS 
Shown in Figure A.1 is a plot of measured and GPS speed as function of time for a trip 
that had a distance of 90,956 m and lasted just over an hour. The figure shows an overall 
agreement between the two signals at least at the level of detail shown in the figure. Also, 
evident in the figure are clear dropouts in GPS speed, with the most obvious examples 
occurring around 1560 and 1870 sec.  
 
Figure A.1. Speed and GPS Speed as a function of time 
 
A closer look at the signals shows that the GPS errors occur at times when the number of 





















drops to three or four. Some examples of these errors are shown in Figure A.2 below 
which includes the number of satellites as a function of time in addition to speed and GPS 
speed (labeled as GPSSpeed in the figure).  
 
Figure A.2. Speed, GPS speed, and number of satellites as a function of time 
 
To quantify the duration and severity of the GPS errors, consider Figure A.3 which shows 
an expanded view of a single episode of GPS speed error. In this example, the duration of 
the error is 0.9 seconds and the maximum error between the signals is approximately 14 
percent. A second example of GPS error is shown in Figure A.4 and lasts 1.1 s. In this 
example, the error between the signals is over 50 percent.  Note that these errors are 
associated with the number of satellites dropping to three or four.  Since four is the 
absolute minimum number required to compute new GPS values, it seems clear that in 
practice, GPS signals alone cannot be used for updates in vehicle speed unless the 

























Figure A.3 Example of a 14 percent GPS Speed error with a 0.9 s duration. 
 
 
Figure A.4. Example of 50 percent GPS speed error with a 1.1 s duration 
 
Finally, consider Figure A.5 which shows the difference between Speed and GPS speed 
for the same set of data. Summarizing these data shows that there is on average a 0.34 






































Start of error End of error
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 Statistics for Delta V 
 No. of points: 38974 
       Average: 0.338 
 Std deviation: 0.884
           RMS: 0.947 
       Minimum:-12.56 
       Maximum: 17.98 
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A.2 Yaw rate from GPS 
 
Figure A.6 shows an example of speed, yaw rate, GPS heading and number of satellites 
as a function of time for a 26 minute trip from the RDCW database (LeBlanc et. al, 
2005). The trip covers a broad range of speeds and includes many turning events as 
shown by the large spikes in yaw rate and corresponding large changes in heading angle. 
Also of note is the discontinuity in GPS heading around due North (0 to 360 degrees), 
which when differentiated to estimate yaw rate must treated as a special case.  
 
 
Figure A.6. Example of speed, yaw rate, GPS heading and number of satellites as 
function of time 
 
Figure A.7 is a 50 sec sample of yaw rate (from a gyro) and GPS estimate of heading for 
a low speed period during the trip first shown in Figure A.1. For comparison this figure 
also shows the derived GPS yaw rate (“GPSYawratesm”) on the same ordinate axis as the 
measured yaw rate. GPSYawratesm was calculated by differentiating GPS heading and 
applying a phase lagged moving average filter over a 0.5 s window prior to the point of 
interest.  This simulates a real-time filtering of the signal. Observations regarding the 
GPS-based estimate of yaw rate include: 
• Noise—even with a half-second moving average filter the signal still has a lot noise 
relative to the measured yaw rate signal. 
• Phase lag—to address noise, the signal must be smoothed which in a real-time 

























































• Slow update rates: In this case the GPS heading signal was not updated during slow 
maneuvers in a parking lot. These maneuvers are seen in the measured yaw rate 
signal between 5 and 15 s but are not being captured by the GPS heading signal. 
Later, in another maneuver (20 to 25 s) the heading change is reflected but there is 
a delay of 1 or 2 s before it changes which introduces large discontinuities in the 
GPSYawratesm single.  The fact that GPS heading does not update at low speeds 
may be a function of the particular receiver used; since heading is based on North 
and East speed components, it is reasonable that a receiver would not provide 
highly noisy heading results at low speeds where the signal to noise for speed 
components would be poor.  
 
 
Figure A.7. Example comparing the GPS-derived yaw rate signal (filtered) with the 
measured yaw rate for a 50 second period of slow speed. 
 
Figure A.8 is another example comparing measured yaw rate to the derived 
GPSYawratesm signal. In this example, a high-speed trip segment was chosen. This 
example illustrates how changing satellite coverage can introduce large amounts of noise 
in the signal. Around 855 s in the figure the number of satellites drops from seven to 
three which causes a marked change in the estimated GPS heading angle. This sudden 
heading change then results in a large amount of variation in the calculated 
GPSYawratesm signal.  
 
Finally, consider Figure A.9 which illustrates how much error there is between the 
measured yaw rate and the calculated GPSYawratesm signals as function of speed. This 
graph was derived by calculating the root-mean-square (RMS) of the difference between 
yaw rate and GPSYawratesm at nine evenly spaced speed bins each with a 4 m/s window. 

























































exponential curve (chisq = 0.76) to get a continuous measure of the error as a function of 
speed. The figure illustrates that the amount of error between the two signals does change 
with speed and increases by at least five fold when comparing speeds above 50 mph to 
speeds below 10 mph. Of course, this graph is specific to the data processing used to 
calculate GPSYawratesm and would change if a more aggressive filter or sophisticated 




Figure A.8. Example comparing the GPS derived yaw rate signal (filtered) with the 




















































































  Fit converged properly
  fit_RMS= W_coef[0]+W_coef[1]*exp(-W_coef[2]*x)
  W_coef={1.4877,12.128,0.070416}
  V_chisq= 0.765215; V_npnts= 9; V_numNaNs= 0; V_numINFs= 0; 
  W_sigma={0.215,1.3,0.0102}
  Coefficient values ± one standard deviation
  y0     = 1.4877 ± 0.215
  A      = 12.128 ± 1.3
  invTau = 0.070416 ± 0.0102
